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While trademarks are designed to promote a competitive and productive marketplace, the current 
system of trademark registration is run by the Patent & Trademark Office as a monopoly of 
questionable productivity. The average time that it takes for the Patent & Trademark Office to 
process a trademark application is fifteen months, and even registrations that do not encounter 
legal issues can require a year. As a result, trademark applicants risk investing substantial sums 
of money into a mark to discover much later that the Patent & Trademark Office will not register it. 
This Article considers a possible solution - a system of privatized trademark registration. The 
system would contain several features: 1) Multiple "entities" serving as registrars: Various private 
entities would compete with each other and register trademarks while sharing one database for 
pending and registered trademarks. Market mechanisms would thus encourage speedier and 
more effective registrations. 2) Optional expedited process: Different entities could employ price 
discrimination calibrated to the speed with which a trademark applicant wants to use his mark. 3) 
Quality control mechanisms: For example, to ensure the quality of the registration process, a 
rating system would permit clients to provide feedback after registration and years later. An entity 
providing ineffective services or issuing trademarks that later faced serious litigation would earn 
poor ratings while a reliable entity would fare well. To explore the viability of trademark 
privatization, the Article relies on both the theoretical privatization literature and practical 
examples in which government exclusivity has been removed from intellectual property (and 
other) decision-making. By challenging assumptions about the status quo surrounding the 
monopoly of the Patent & Trademark Office, the Article seeks to open a more general discussion 
about improvements to the existing system of trademark registration 
